







Abstract. The paper presents a new logic for reasoning about the formation of beliefs
through perception or through inference in non-omniscient resource-bounded agents. The
logic distinguishes the concept of explicit belief from the concept of background knowledge.
This distinction is reflected in its formal semantics and axiomatics: (i) we use a non-
standard semantics putting together a neighborhood semantics for explicit beliefs and
relational semantics for background knowledge, and (ii) we have specific axioms in the logic
highlighting the relationship between the two concepts. Mental operations of perceptive
type and inferential type, having effects on epistemic states of agents, are primitives in
the object language of the logic. At the semantic level, they are modelled as special kinds
of model-update operations, in the style of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). Results about
axiomatization, decidability and complexity for the logic are given in the paper.
Keywords: Epistemic logic; cognitive agents; resource-bounded reasoning
1. Introduction
Most existing logical theories of epistemic attitudes developed in the area of
epistemic logic assume that agents are omniscient, in the sense that: (i) their
beliefs are closed under conjunction and implication, i.e., if ϕ is believed and
ψ is believed then ϕ∧ψ is believed and if ϕ is believed and ϕ→ ψ is believed
then ψ is believed; (ii) their beliefs are closed under logical consequence (alias
valid implication), i.e., if ϕ is believed and ϕ logically implies ψ, i.e., ϕ→ ψ
is valid, then ψ is believed as well; (iii) they believe all valid sentences or
tautologies; (iv) they have introspection over their beliefs, i.e., if ϕ is believed
then it is believed that ϕ is believed.
As pointed out by [25, 31], relaxing the assumption of logical omniscience
allows for a resource-bounded agent who might fail to draw any connection
between ϕ and its logical consequence ψ and, consequently, who might not
believe some valid sentences and who might need time to infer and form new
beliefs from her existing knowledge and beliefs.
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The aim of this paper is to propose a new logic which helps in clarifying
how a non-omniscient resource-bounded agent can form new beliefs either
through perception or through inference from her existing knowledge and
beliefs. More precisely, the aim of the paper is to introduce a dynamic logic,
called DLEK (Dynamic Logic of Explicit Beliefs and Knowledge) in which
programs are mental operations, either of perceptive type or of inferential
type, having effects on epistemic states of resourced-bounded agents.
DLEK is a logical theory of the relationship between explicit beliefs and
background knowledge, both from a static and from a dynamic perspective.
This distinction is reflected in its formal semantics and axiomatics: (i) we
use a non-standard semantics putting together a neighborhood semantics for
explicit beliefs and relational semantics for background knowledge, and (ii)
we have specific axioms in the logic highlighting the relationship between
the two concepts.
Related work DLEK is not the first logic of epistemic attitudes for non-
omniscient agents. Logics of awareness have been studied in the recent years
(see, e.g., [36, 24, 22, 1]) starting from the seminal work of Fagin & Halpern
[15]. These logics distinguish between awareness, implicit belief and explicit
belief. Awareness and implicit belief are primitive and explicit belief is
defined as that implicit belief the agent is aware of. (See [28] for a critical
discussion on this family of logics.) The crucial difference between DLEK
and existing logics of awareness is that the latter make no use of concepts
as ‘reasoning’ or ‘inference’. On the contrary, DLEK provides a constructive
theory of explicit beliefs, as it accounts for the perceptive and inferential
steps leading from an agent’s knowledge and beliefs to new beliefs. This
‘constructive’ aspect of epistemic attitudes is something our theory shares
with other approaches in the literature including the dynamic theory of
evidence-based beliefs by [35] — that also use a neighborhood semantics for
the notion of evidence —, the sentential approach to explicit beliefs and their
dynamics by [29], and the dynamic theory of explicit and implicit beliefs by
[38].
The logic of inference steps by Velázquez-Quesada [39] and the logical
system DES4n by Duc [11] share a similar view with us as well. In particular,
Velázquez-Quesada shares with us the idea of modeling inference steps by
means of dynamic operators in the style of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL)
[37]. Nonetheless, our conceptual framework is different from his (see Section
2). He does not distinguish the concept of explicit belief and the concept
of background knowledge, which is the fundamental distinction of our logic
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DLEK. Furthermore, he does not provide any axiomatization or decidability
result for his logic of inference steps, as he only provides a semantics.
Duc’s system DES4n combines epistemic operators for truthful and non-
omniscient knowledge of type Ki, that allows to represent the fact that a
certain agent i knows something, with tense-like operators of type 〈Fi〉, that
allows to represent the fact that a certain agent i will possibly get to know
something.1 Duc’s system shares with our logic DLEK the idea that (i) an
agent gets to know (or believe) something by performing inferences, and (ii)
making inferences takes time. Nonetheless, while in our logic DLEK infer-
ential operations are represented both at the syntactic level, via dynamic
operators in the DEL style, and a semantic level, as model update opera-
tions, in Duc’s system and its formal semantics given by [2] they are not.
The formal semantics for DES4n given by Ågotnes & Alechina is a Kripke-
style semantics in which every operator 〈Fi〉 is associated with an abstract
accessibility relation Ri over possible worlds, where wRiv means that world
w is related with world v. This semantics does not say anything about
the kind of inferential operation (or sequence of inferential operations) that
is responsible for the transition from world w to world v. More generally,
the system DES4n does not support reasoning about the consequences of
a specific kind of inferential operation such as application of modus ponens
or closure under conjunction on an agent’s knowledge or beliefs. On the
contrary, this is something our logic DLEK can express.
Another related work is [4], which presents a semantics for a variant
of Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) extended by explicit knowledge
operators. This logic supports reasoning about, among other things, the
capability of an agent of gaining some knowledge by applying a certain rea-
soning rule such as reasoning with modus ponens or reasoning monotonically.
This logic does not take into account the distinction between explicit knowl-
edge (or belief) and background knowledge which is fundamental for our
analysis. But, the most important difference between this system and ours
is their belonging to two different families of logics. Ågotnes & Walicki’s
logic is a logic for strategic reasoning with a semantics based on the concept
of concurrent game structure (CGS). It has modal operators of strategic
capability that represent what an agent or coalition of agents can achieve
by playing a certain strategy. On the contrary, our logic DLEK belongs to
the family of dynamic epistemic logics whose main constituents are dynamic
modal operators that allow to represent the consequences of a specific com-
1The dual of 〈Fi〉, denoted by [Fi], allows to represent the fact that a certain agent i
will necessarily get to know something.
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municative action or mental operation. Apart from some rare exceptions
(see, e.g., [32, 3]), the connection between the two families of logics has been
rarely explored. Moreover, it is not the object of the present work.
Our constructive approach to explicit beliefs also distinguishes DLEK
from existing logics of time-bounded reasoning which represent reasoning as
a process that requires time (see, e.g., [6, 21]). Active logics [12, 14] are
representative of the research in this area. They account for the formation
of new beliefs due to the time-consuming application of inference rules to
the beliefs that are under the focus of attention. Specifically, the basic se-
mantics of active logics, as presented in [14], includes three components: (i)
an agent’s belief set, identifying all facts that an agent explicitly believes,
(ii) an observation function, identifying all facts that an agent observes at
a given time point, and (iii) an inference function, specifying what an agent
should believe at the next time point on the basis of the application of the
inference rules she possesses on her belief set, given her actual observations.
Nonetheless, there are important differences between active logics and our
logic DLEK. First of all, active logics do not belong to the family of modal
logics, while DLEK does. The latter has an advantage. As we will show
in the paper, we can use existing techniques from modal logic in order to
prove results about mathematical and computational properties of our logic.
This includes the canonical-model argument for proving completeness of its
axiomatics, the filtration argument for proving decidability of its satisfia-
bility problem, and modal tableaux for stating complexity of this problem.
Second, while active logics provide models of reasoning based on long-term
memory and short-term memory (or working memory) (see, e.g., [13]), they
do not distinguish between the notion of explicit belief and the notion of
background knowledge, conceived as different kinds of epistemic attitudes.
As we will show in Section 2, these two notions are the basic building blocks
of our theory of belief dynamics in resource-bounded agents. Third, by ex-
ploiting the rich model-update semantics of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL)
[37], our logic DLEK accounts for a variety of mental operations (or processes)
that have not been explored in the active logic literature. This includes, for
example, forgetting that a certain fact is true, ascribing to someone the exe-
cution of certain inference step, being uncertain that someone has performed
a certain inference step. The latter mental operations correspond to basic
operations of mindreading in the sense of Theory of Mind (ToM) [19].
Plan of the paper The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
present the conceptual foundation of our logic DLEK, namely the general
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view about dynamics of beliefs in resource-bounded agents which underlies
our formal theory. The general idea is that new beliefs can be formed either
by perception or by inferring them from existing beliefs in working mem-
ory and by retrieving information from background knowledge in long-term
memory. Section 3 presents the syntax and the semantics of DLEK. We will
show that, in DLEK, perceptive and inferential steps are modelled as special
kinds of model-update operations. Section 4 is devoted to presenting an ax-
iomatic system and showing its completeness. Section 5 presents complexity
results for the satisfiability problem of the static fragment of DLEK, called
LEK, as well as a decidability result for the satisfiability problem of DLEK.
Given that the semantics of the static fragment of DLEK are non-standard,
in Section 6 we show how they can be reduced to purely relational semantics,
albeit with additional modalities.
2. Conceptual framework
The cognitive architecture underlying the logic DLEK (Dynamic Logic of
Explicit Beliefs and Knowledge) is represented in Figure 1. It clarifies the










Figure 1. Cognitive view of the relationship between background knowledge and explicit
beliefs
In accordance with existing psychological theories and computational
models of memory and attention [7, 10, 40, 33], we assume that an agent has
two kinds of information in her mind, those available in long-term memory
(LTM) and those directly accessible in working memory (WM).
The information available in LTM, generally called background knowl-
edge, includes both knowledge of specific events in the past and conceptual
or causal knowledge representing the agent’s unproblematic interpretation
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of reality.2 For example, an agent may have background conceptual knowl-
edge about how restaurants are organized or background causal knowledge
about the relation between smoke and fire. In particular, she may know that
restaurants have waiters, chairs and tables or that if smoke comes out from
a window of a certain house, then there is fire inside the house.
WM retains information in an accessible state suitable for carrying out
any kind of reasoning or decision task. In particular, following [27], we as-
sume that the information available in an agent’s working memory includes
all explicit beliefs of the agent that occupy her consciousness and draw on
her limited capacity of attention.3 Some explicit beliefs are formed via per-
ception. Formation of explicit beliefs via perception just consists of adding
a new belief to the set of beliefs that are under the focus of the agent’s at-
tention. For example, an agent may look outside the window, see that it is
raining outside, and thereby start believing that it is raining outside.
An agent can also use her explicit beliefs as premises of an inference
which leads to the formation of a new belief. In some cases, formation
of explicit beliefs via inference requires the retrieval of information from
long-term memory. For example, suppose that an agent sees that smoke
comes out from the window of a certain house and, as a result, she starts to
explicitly believe this. The agent retrieves from her background knowledge
stored in her long-term memory the information that if smoke comes out
from a window of a certain house, then it means that there is fire inside
the house. The agent can use this information together with the belief that
smoke comes out from the window available in her working memory, to infer
that there is fire inside the house and to form the corresponding belief.
Information can also be lost from working memory through forgetting :
an agent may explicitly believe something but not believe it anymore at
a later point. Information can also be removed from working memory and
stored in long-term memory to make it available for a later moment. Storage
of information in long-term memory might be necessary, given the limited
capabilities of working memory. In the paper, we do not discuss this latter
operation. We leave its formalization for future work.
In the next section we present the syntax and the semantics of the logic
DLEK which makes precise all concepts informally discussed in this section.
2In the Soar architecture [30] these two kinds of background are called, respectively,
episodic memory and semantic memory.
3Some psychologists (e.g., [10]) distinguish focus of attention from working memory,
as they assume that there might be information activated in working memory which is
not under the focus of the agent’s attention. For simplicity, we here assume that focus of
attention and working memory are coextensive.
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3. Logical framework
DLEK is a logic which consists of a static component and a dynamic one. The
static component, called LEK, is a logic of explicit beliefs and background
knowledge. The dynamic component extends the static one with dynamic
operators capturing the consequences of the agents’ mental operations on
their explicit beliefs. Since private mental operations may lead other agents
to not contemplate the real world as a possibility, we will work with KD45
models, although we also consider logics DLEK+, LEK+, where a truthful S5
notion of background knowledge is used instead.
3.1. Syntax
Assume a countable set of atomic propositions Atm = {p, q, . . .} and a finite
set of agents Agt = {1, . . . , n}. By Prop we denote the set of all propositional
formulas, i.e. the set of all Boolean formulas built out of the set of atomic
propositions Atm.
The language of DLEK, denoted by LDLEK, is defined by the following
grammar in Backus-Naur form:
α ::= `(ϕ,ψ) | ∩(ϕ,ψ) | +ϕ | −ϕ
ϕ,ψ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Biϕ | Kiϕ | [(G:α)H ]ϕ
where p ranges over Atm and G,H range over 2Agt with G ⊆ H.
The other Boolean constructions >, ⊥, ∨, → and ↔ are defined from p,
¬ and ∧ in the standard way. For every formula ϕ, let SF (ϕ) be the closure
under single negations of the set of all of ϕ’s subformulas.
The language of LEK, the fragment of DLEK without dynamic operators,
is denoted by LLEK and defined by the following grammar in Backus-Naur
Form:
ϕ,ψ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Biϕ | Kiϕ.
In what follows, we explain the meaning of the operators of our logic.
The formula Biϕ is read “the agent i explicitly believes that ϕ is true” or,
more shortly, “the agent i believes that ϕ is true”. As explained in Section 2,
explicit beliefs are accessible in working memory and are the basic elements
of the agents’ reasoning process. Following the logic of local reasoning by
Fagin & Halpern [15], we wish to give a purely semantical model of explicit
belief. As we will show in Section 4, an effect of this approach is that agents
cannot distinguish between logically equivalent formulas, i.e., if two facts
ϕ and ψ are logically equivalent and an agent explicitly believes that ϕ is
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true, then she believes that ψ is true as well. There are other approaches,
such as justification logics [5], that do not have this feature. However, the
interpretation of these logics relies highly on syntax, a situation we wish to
avoid in the present paper.
The modal operator Ki captures the notion of background knowledge
discussed in Section 2. It represents the information that agent i can use to
infer new explicit beliefs. Some pieces of background knowledge are either
conceptual or causal and represent the agent’s unproblematic interpretation
of reality.
Unlike explicit beliefs, background knowledge is assumed to satisfy ‘om-
niscience’ principles like closure under conjunction and known implication,
closure under logical consequence and introspection. Moreover, background
knowledge is assumed to be veridical. Specifically, as we will show below,
Ki is nothing but the well-known S5 (or, more generally, KD45) operator for
knowledge widely used in computer science [16]. The fact that background
knowledge is veridical and closed under logical consequence is justified in two
terms. First of all, we assume it to be veridical since knowledge, differently
from belief, is commonly assumed to be truthful. Secondly, we assume it to
be closed under logical consequence since we conceive it as a kind of deduc-
tively closed knowledge base. Specifically, we assume background knowledge
to include all facts that the agent has stored in her long-term memory (LTM),
after having processed them in her working memory (WM), as well as all
logical consequences of these facts.
The formula [(G:α)H ]ψ should be read “ψ holds after the mental oper-
ation (or mental action) α is performed by all agents in G, and the agents
in H have common knowledge about this fact”. Of course G and H may
be singletons, but we also wish to model situations where a group of agents
G makes a collective mental operation (say, after a discussion or public an-
nouncement) and the agents in a larger group H of which G is a subset have
common knowledge about this fact. For example, suppose Ann and Bob
are sitting on the sofa in the living-room while Charles gets into it. Ann
and Bob see Charles getting into the living-room (i.e., {Ann,Bob} is the set
G). Charles is so noisy that everybody knows that Ann and Bob have seen
him getting into the living-room. More generally, Ann, Bob and Charles
have common knowledge that Ann and Bob have seen Charles getting into
the living-room (i.e., {Ann,Bob,Charles} is the set H). We may sometimes
write [α] instead of [(G:α)H ] when G and H are clear from context.
We distinguish four types of mental operations α which allow us to cap-
ture some of the dynamic properties of explicit beliefs and background knowl-
edge informally described in Section 2 above: +ϕ, −ϕ, `(ϕ,ψ) and ∩(ϕ,ψ).
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The operations +ϕ and −ϕ correspond, respectively, to the mental opera-
tions of forming an explicit belief via perception and forgetting an explicit
belief represented in Figure 1. `(ϕ,ψ) and ∩(ϕ,ψ) characterize two basic
operations of forming explicit beliefs via inference. Specifically, `(ϕ,ψ) is
the mental operation which consists in inferring ψ from ϕ in case ϕ is be-
lieved and, according to an agent’s background knowledge, ψ is a logical
consequence of ϕ. In other words, by performing this mental operation, an
agent tries to retrieve from her background knowledge in long-term memory
the information that ϕ implies ψ and, if she succeeds, she starts to believe
ψ.4 ∩(ϕ,ψ) is the mental operation which consists in closing the explicit
belief that ϕ and the explicit belief that ψ under conjunction. In other
words, ∩(ϕ,ψ) characterizes the mental operation of deducing ϕ ∧ ψ from
the explicit belief that ϕ and the explicit belief that ψ.
In this paper we assume that, differently from explicit beliefs, background
knowledge is irrevocable in the sense of being stable over time [9]. In the
conclusion, we will offer some insights on how to make background knowledge
dynamic by including in our logic the operation of storing information in
long-term memory, represented in Figure 1.
3.2. Semantics
The main notion in semantics is given by the following definition of LEK
(LEK+) model which provides the basic components for the interpretation
of the static logics:
Definition 1 (LEK/LEK+ model). We define a LEK model to be a tuple
M = (W,N,R1, . . . , Rn, V ) where:
(a) W is a set of worlds or situations;
(b) for every i ∈ Agt, Ri ⊆ W ×W is a serial, transitive and Euclidean5
relation on W ;
(c) N : Agt×W −→ 22W is a neighborhood function such that for all i ∈ Agt,
w, v ∈W and X ⊆W :
(C1) if X ∈ N(i, w) then X ⊆ Ri(w),
(C2) if wRiv then N(i, w) = N(i, v);
4Note that retrieving the information “ϕ implies ψ” from long-term memory here just
means that the agent uses it for drawing her inference, without ‘loading’ it in her explicit
beliefs.
5Recall that R is serial if, for every w, there is a y such that wRy, and Euclidean if,
whenever wRu and wRv, it follows that uRv.
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(d) V : W −→ 2Atm is a valuation function.
A LEK+ model is a LEK model such that each Ri is reflexive.
For every i ∈ Agt and w ∈W , Ri(w) = {v ∈W : wRiv} identifies the set
of situations that agent i considers possible at world w. In cognitive terms,
Ri(w) can be conceived as the set of all situations that agent i can retrieve
from her long-term memory and reason about them. More generally, Ri(w)
is called agent i’s epistemic state at w. In LEK+-models, the reason why Ri
is an equivalence relation is that it is used to model a form of omniscient
background knowledge instead of omniscient background belief. The latter
could be modelled, as in LEK-models, by replacing the equivalence relations
Ri by serial, transitive and Euclidean relations commonly used in doxastic
logic to model a notion of belief.
For every i ∈ Agt and every w ∈ W , N(i, w) defines the set of all facts
that agent i explicitly believes at world w, a fact being identified with a set
of worlds. More precisely, if A ∈ N(i, w) then, at world w, agent i has the
fact A under the focus of her attention and believes it. N(i, w) is called
agent i’s explicit belief set at world w.
Constraint (C1) just means that an agent can have explicit in her mind
only facts which are compatible with her current epistemic state. According
to Constraint (C2), if world v is compatible with agent i’s epistemic state
at world w, then agent i should have the same explicit beliefs at w and v.
Truth conditions of DLEK formulas are inductively defined as follows.
Definition 2. For a LEK model M = (W,N,R1, . . . , Rn, V ), a world w ∈
W , a formula ϕ ∈ LLEK, and an action α, we define the truth relation
M,w |= ϕ and a new LEK model M (G:α)H by simultaneous recursion on α
and ϕ as follows. Below, we write
‖ϕ‖Mi,w = {v ∈W : wRiv and M,v |= ϕ}
whenever M,v |= ϕ is well-defined. Then, we set:
M,w |= p ⇐⇒ p ∈ V (w)
M,w |= ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M,w 6|= ϕ
M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
M,w |= Biϕ ⇐⇒ ||ϕ||Mi,w ∈ N(i, w)
M,w |= Kiϕ ⇐⇒ M,v |= ϕ for all v ∈ Ri(w)
M,w |= [(G:α)H ]ϕ ⇐⇒ M (G:α)H , w0 |= ϕ
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where M (G:α)H = (W (G:α)H , N (G:α)H , R
(G:α)H
1 , . . . , R
(G:α)H
n , V (G:α)H ) is de-
fined as follows.
First, for i ∈ Agt and w ∈W , set
N+ψ(i, w) = N(i, w) ∪ {||ψ||Mi,w}
N−ψ(i, w) = N(i, w) \ {||ψ||Mi,w}
N`(ψ,χ)(i, w) =
{




N(i, w) ∪ {||ψ ∧ χ||Mi,w} if M,w |= Biψ ∧ Biχ
N(i, w) otherwise
Then we define
W (G:α)H = W × {0, 1}
N (G:α)H (i, w0) = {X × {0} : X ∈ Nα(i, w)} if i ∈ G
N (G:α)H (i, w1) = {X × {1} : X ∈ N(i, w)} if i ∈ G
N (G:α)H (i, w0) = {X × {0} : X ∈ N(i, w)} if i ∈ H \G
N (G:α)H (i, w1) = {X × {1} : X ∈ N(i, w)} if i ∈ H \G
N (G:α)H (i, w0) = {X × {1} : X ∈ N(i, w)} if i 6∈ H
N (G:α)H (i, w1) = {X × {1} : X ∈ N(i, w)} if i 6∈ H
R
(G:α)H
i = {(w0, v0) : wRiv} ∪ {(w1, v1) : wRiv} if i ∈ H
R
(G:α)H
i = {(w0, v1) : wRiv} ∪ {(w1, v1) : wRiv} if if i 6∈ H
V (G:α)H (wx) = V (w) with x ∈ {0, 1}
where, for notational convenience, elements of W (G:α)H are denoted by w0,
w1 instead of (w, 0), (w, 1).
The fact that the mental operation α is performed by the agents in G
and this is only common knowledge for the agents in H is captured by the
duplication of the original model M . The 0-part of the original model is
the part in which agents in G update their explicit beliefs via the mental
operation α, while the 1-part is the part in which nothing happens. All
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agents inside H are aware that those in G have changed their beliefs via the
mental operation α, as they have access to the 0-part. On the contrary, the
agents outside of H are not aware that those in G have changed their beliefs
via the mental operation α, as they only have access to the 1-part thereby
assuming that nothing happens.
Note that such an operation will cause the accessibility relation for agents
not in H to no longer be reflexive, even if they originally were. Nevertheless,
these operations are well-defined over the class of LEK models. Remark
that for all dynamic operators α, for all i ∈ Agt and for all w ∈ W , the
neighborhood function Nα(i, w) still satisfies the constraints (C1) and (C2).
Note that thanks to Constraint (C1), we can assume, in a mono-agent LEK
model M = (W,N,R1, V ), that R1 is the universal relation on W .
Proposition 1. If M is a LEK model then M (G:α)H is also a LEK model. If
moreover H = Agt and M is a LEK+ model, then M (G:α)H is also a LEK+
model.
According to the previous truth conditions, an agent i explicitly believes
ϕ at world w if and only if, at world w, agent i has the fact corresponding
to the formula ϕ (i.e., ||ϕ||Mi,w) included in her explicit belief set. Note that
this semantic interpretation is different from the usual one for neighborhood
formulas, as we restrict the extension of ϕ to the agent’s epistemically ac-
cessible worlds. This is justified by the fact that an agent’s explicit beliefs
are relative to her background knowledge. The latter guarantees that if an
agent explicitly believes that ϕ is true (i.e., Biϕ) while having background
knowledge that ϕ is false (i.e., Ki¬ϕ) then, she explicitly entertains a con-
tradiction (i.e., Bi⊥). This seems a reasonable property of explicit beliefs.
Moreover, an agent has background knowledge that ϕ is true if and only if
ϕ is true in all situations that are included in the agent’s epistemic state.
Mental operations of the form α are formalized as model update opera-
tions that expand or contract the agents’ explicit belief sets. In particular,
the mental operation +ψ consists of perceiving ψ and adding it to the ex-
plicit belief set, while the mental operation −ψ consists of forgetting ψ and
removing it from the explicit belief set. The mental operation `(ψ,χ) con-
sists of adding the explicit belief χ to an agent’s explicit belief set if the
agent believes ψ and has background knowledge that ψ implies χ. The men-
tal operation ∩(ψ,χ) consists of adding the explicit belief ψ∧χ to an agent’s
explicit belief set if the agent explicitly believes both ψ and χ. Note that the
preconditions for the mental operations `(ψ,χ) and ∩(ψ,χ) do not appear
in the semantic interpretation of the modality (as in, e.g., public announce-
ments [37]); they are rather ‘embedded’ in the definition of the operation.
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We write |=DLEK ϕ (|=DLEK+ ϕ) to denote that ϕ is valid, i.e., ϕ is true at
every world w of every LEK(LEK+)-model M . In the next section we show
some interesting validities of the logics DLEK and DLEK+.
3.3. Some validities
The following four validities capture the basic properties of the four mental
operations ` (ϕ,ψ), ∩(ϕ,ψ), +ϕ and −ϕ semantically defined above. Let
ϕ,ψ ∈ Prop and i ∈ G ⊆ H ⊆ Agt . Then, the following are valid over the
class of LEK-models:
1. (Ki(ϕ→ψ) ∧ Biϕ)→ [(G: `(ϕ,ψ))H ]Biψ
2. (Biϕ ∧ Biψ)→[(G: ∩ (ϕ,ψ))H ]Bi(ϕ ∧ ψ)
3. [(G: + ϕ)H ]Biϕ
4. [(G:− ϕ)H ]¬Biϕ
For instance, according to the first validity, if ϕ and ψ are propositional
formulas, agent i explicitly believes ϕ and has background knowledge that
ϕ implies ψ then, as a consequence of the mental operation `(ϕ,ψ), she will
start to believe ψ. According to the third validity, if ϕ is a propositional
formula then, as a consequence of perceiving that ϕ is true, agent i starts to
explicitly believe that ϕ is true.
The reason why we need to impose that ϕ and ψ are propositional
formulas is that there are DLEK-formulas such as the Moore-like formula
p ∧ ¬Bip for which the previous four principles do not hold. For instance,
[({i}: + (p ∧ ¬Bip)){i}]Bi(p ∧ ¬Bip) is not valid.
It is worth noting that in the logics DLEK and DLEK+ we can ‘simulate’
in a dynamic way the rule of necessitation. Indeed, for λ ∈ {DLEK+,DLEK},
if |=λ ϕ and i ∈ G, then |=λ [(G: + >)H ]Biϕ. This is a consequence of the
semantic interpretation of the explicit belief operator (Definition 2) in which
the extension of ϕ is restricted to the agent’s epistemically accessible worlds.
We have only included a conjunction introduction operation for explicit
beliefs for the sake of technical simplicity, but in the case of propositional
formulas, other inference rules can be simulated using these operations, via
the following validities, for ϕ,ψ ∈ Prop and i ∈ G ⊆ H ⊆ Agt . Recall that
for notational convenience we write α instead of (G:α)H .
1. |=DLEK (Biϕ ∧ Bi(ϕ→ ψ))→ [∩(ϕ,ϕ→ ψ)][`(ϕ ∧ ψ,ψ)]Biψ
2. |=DLEK Biϕ→ [`(ϕ,ϕ→ (ϕ ∨ ψ))]Bi(ϕ ∨ ψ)
3. |=DLEK Biψ → [`(ψ,ψ → (ϕ ∨ ψ))]Bi(ϕ ∨ ψ)
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4. |=DLEK Bi(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ [`(ϕ ∧ ψ,ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ))]Biϕ
5. |=DLEK Bi(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ [`(ϕ ∧ ψ,ϕ ∧ ψ → ψ))]Biψ
Thus we can define modus ponens, disjunction introduction, and conjunction
elimination using the mental operations we have presented. The general idea
here is that in order to apply modus ponens, disjunction introduction, or
conjunction elimination, an agent has to retrieve some information from her
background knowledge. For example, in the case of conjunction elimination,
she has to retrieve the information that “ϕ ∧ ψ implies ϕ”. Of course, an
alternative approach where all of these operations are ‘hard-wired’ into the
logic and do not require retrieval of information from background knowledge
may be preferable if e.g we wish to minimize the number of reasoning steps
that the agents need to use.
3.4. Example
In this section we are going to illustrate our logic DLEK with the help of
a concrete example. The scenario goes as follows. There are two resource-
bounded robotic assistants, say robot A (Anne) and robotB (Bob), who have
to take care of a person. The person communicates with the robots via a
coloured electric light which can be either red or green. The communication
code is the following one: (i) if the electric light is red (atom r) then it means
that the person needs help (atom h), and (ii) if the electric is green (atom g)
then it means that the person is having a rest and wants not to be bothered
(atom b). We assume that:
H1. robot A has full knowledge about the communication code as she knows
that r implies h and that g implies b, and
H2. robot B has only partial knowledge about the communication code as
he knows that r implies h but he does not know that g implies b.
Thus, let us suppose that G = H = Agt = {A,B} and Atm = {r, g, h, b}.
We represent the initial situation by a minimal LEK model satisfying the
hypothesis H1 and H2 and which only excludes the impossible situations
in which the electric light is both red and green and the person needs
help and takes a rest at the same time.6 This model is the tuple MR =
(W,N,RA, RB, V ) (where MR stands for ‘model of the robots’) such that:
6Note that the model satisfies the additional hypothesis that robot A and robot B have
common knowledge that they share a part of the communication code, namely that each
of them knows that r implies h.
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• W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8, w9};
• N(i, w) = ∅ for all i ∈ Agt and for all w ∈W ;
• the quotient set of W by RA is {{w1, w2, w3, w4, w5}, {w6, w7}, {w8, w9}};
• the quotient set of W by RB is {{w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7}, {w8, w9}};
• V (w1) = {r, h}, V (w2) = {h}, V (w3) = {g, b}, V (w4) = {b}, V (w5) = ∅,
V (w6) = {g}, V (w7) = {g, h}, V (w8) = {r}, and V (w9) = {r, b}.
The fact that N(i, w) = ∅ for all i ∈ Agt and for all w ∈ W just means
that in the initial situation the robots have no explicit belief in their short-
term memories. Let us assume that w1 is the actual situation in which the
electric light is red and the person needs help.
The first thing to observe is that in the actual situation the hypothesis
H1 and H2 are both satisfied. Indeed, as for H1, we have: MR, w1 |= KA(r →
h) ∧ KA(g → b). As for H2, we have: MR, w1 |= KB(r → h) ∧ ¬KB(g → b).
Let us suppose that the person switches on the red light in order to
signal to the two robots that she needs help. This event is represented by
the mental operation +r which leads from model MR to the updated model
MR+r = (W,N+r, RA, RB, V ) such that:
N+r(A,w1) = {{w1}}, N+r(A,w2) = {{w1}}, N+r(A,w3) = {{w1}},
N+r(A,w4) = {{w1}}, N+r(A,w5) = {{w1}}, N+r(A,w6) = ∅,
N+r(A,w7) = ∅, N+r(A,w8) = {{w8, w9}}, N+r(A,w9) = {{w8, w9}},
N+r(B,w1) = {{w1}}, N+r(B,w2) = {{w1}}, N+r(B,w3) = {{w1}},
N+r(B,w4) = {{w1}}, N+r(B,w5) = {{w1}}, N+r(B,w6) = {{w1}},
N+r(B,w7) = {{w1}}, N+r(B,w8) = {{w8, w9}}, N+r(B,w9) = {{w8, w9}}.
Note that the only difference between between A’s and B’s neighbour-
hoods at MR+r is on worlds w6 and w7.
It is easy to check that in the new situation, after the mental operation
+r has been executed, the two robots explicitly believe that the light is red.
That is: MR+r, w1 |= B{A,B}r, where B{A,B}ϕ is a abbreviation of BAϕ∧BBϕ.
However, the mental operation is not sufficient to guarantee that the robots
believe that the person needs helps. Indeed, we have: MR+r, w1 |= ¬BAh ∧
¬BBh.
It is by trying to infer that the person needs help from the fact that she
switched on the red light, represented by `(r,h), that the robots can form
this explicit belief. The mental operation `(r,h) leads from model MR+r to
the updated model (MR+r)`(r,h) = (W, (N+r)`(r,h), RA, RB, V ) such that:
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(N+r)`(r,h)(A,w1) = {{w1}, {w1, w2}}, (N+r)`(r,h)(A,w2) = {{w1}, {w1, w2}},
(N+r)`(r,h)(A,w3) = {{w1}, {w1, w2}}, (N+r)`(r,h)(A,w4) = {{w1}, {w1, w2}},
(N+r)`(r,h)(A,w5) = {{w1}, {w1, w2}}, (N+r)`(r,h)(A,w6) = ∅,
(N+r)`(r,h)(A,w7) = ∅, (N+r)`(r,h)(A,w8) = {{w8, w9}},
(N+r)`(r,h)(A,w9) = {{w8, w9}}, (N+r)`(r,h)(B,w1) = {{w1}, {w1, w2, w7}},
(N+r)`(r,h)(B,w2) = {{w1}, {w1, w2, w7}}, (N+r)`(r,h)(B,w3) = {{w1}, {w1, w2, w7}},
(N+r)`(r,h)(B,w4) = {{w1}, {w1, w2, w7}}, (N+r)`(r,h)(B,w5) = {{w1}, {w1, w2, w7}},
(N+r)`(r,h)(B,w6) = {{w1}, {w1, w2, w7}}, (N+r)`(r,h)(B,w7) = {{w1}, {w1, w2, w7}},
(N+r)`(r,h)(B,w8) = {{w8, w9}}, (N+r)`(r,h)(B,w9) = {{w8, w9}}.
It is easy to check that in the new situation, after the mental operation
` (r,h) has been executed, the two robots explicitly believe that the person
needs help. That is: (MR+r)`(r,h), w1 |= B{A,B}h. To sum up, we have that
the following holds:
MR, w1 |= [+r]B{A,B}r ∧ [+r](¬BAh ∧ ¬BBh) ∧ [+r][`(r,h)]B{A,B}h.
It is just routine to check that the mental operations +g and ` (g,b)
are also sufficient for robot A to start to believe b explicitly after perform-
ing them, but they are not sufficient for robot B since he does not have
background knowledge that g implies b. In formal terms, we have:
MR, w1 |= [+g][`(g,b)]BAb, MR, w1 |= [+g][`(g,b)]¬BBb.
3.5. Discussion: uncertainty about mental operations of others
In the previous semantics of events (G:α)H , we assumed that if agents of a
group G perform a mental operation, then every agent in H knows this and
agents in H have common knowledge about this fact. In certain situations,
it would be useful to relax this assumption by representing the fact that
an agent i may be uncertain that another agent j has performed a certain
mental operation. In particular, we would like to represent the following
situation:
Agent j performs the mental operation α, while agent i envisages
that j could have possibly performed it and that j has performed no
mental operation at all.
Our discussion could be generalized to the situation in which agent i envis-
ages a finite set Σ of mental operations that j could have possibly performed.
For simplicity of exposition, we only consider the case in which Σ is a sin-
gleton.7
7Notice that it would not make sense to consider the situation in which, for every mental
operation α, agent i considers it possible both that agent j has performed α and that j
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In order to represent the previous situation in a formal way, we discuss
here the semantics of a new type of events and corresponding dynamic oper-
ators of the form [?i,jα] with i 6= j where ?i,jα represents the event of agent
i questioning whether agent j has performed the mental operation α.
When the event ?i,jα takes place, at the same time, (i) agent i considers
it possible that agent j has performed the mental operation α and (ii) agent
i considers it possible that agent j has performed no mental operation at
all. In other words, agent i is uncertain whether the mental operation α has
been performed by agent j.
Truth conditions of formulas [?i,jα]ϕ are defined as follows:
M,w |= [?i,jα]ϕ ⇐⇒ M?i,jα, w0 |= ϕ
M?i,jα = (W ?i,jα, N?i,jα, R
?i,jα
1 , . . . , R
?i,jα
n , V ?i,jα) is the updated model such
that for all k ∈ Agt and for all w ∈W :
W ?i,jα = W × {0, 1}
N?i,jα(j, w0) = {X × {0} : X ∈ Nα(j, w)}
N?i,jα(j, w1) = {X × {1} : X ∈ N(j, w)}
N?i,jα(i, w0) = {X × {0, 1} : X ∈ N(i, w)}
N?i,jα(i, w1) = {X × {0, 1} : X ∈ N(i, w)}
N?i,jα(k,w0) = {X × {1} : X ∈ N(k,w)} if k 6= i and k 6= j
N?i,jα(k,w1) = {X × {1} : X ∈ N(k,w)} if k 6= i and k 6= j
R
?i,jα
i = {(wx, vy) : x, y ∈ {0, 1} and wRiv}
R
?i,jα
j = {(w0, v0) : wRjv} ∪ {(w1, v1) : wRjv}
R
?i,jα
k = {(w0, v1) : wRkv} ∪ {(w1, v1) : wRkv} if k 6= i and k 6= j
V ?i,jα(wx) = V (w) with x ∈ {0, 1}
The following proposition guarantees that the semantics of the operator
[?i,jα] with respect to the class of LEK models is well defined:
Proposition 2. If M is a LEK model then M?i,jα is also a LEK model.
has not performed α, as this is incompatible with the concept of resource-bounded agent.
Indeed, there exists an infinite number of possible mental operations α. Furthermore,
by definition, a resource-bounded agent is able to represent in her mind and to imagine
an finite number of events that might occur at a given time but is unable to imagine an
infinite number of events.
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Notice that, in a way similar to the semantics of the events (G:α)H , in the
definition of the updated model M?i,jα, there are two copies of the original
model. In the copy 0, agent j performs the mental operation α whereas in
the copy 1 agent j does nothing. Agent i cannot distinguish copy 0 from
copy 1. This is the reason why i is uncertain about the performance of the
mental operation α by agent j. All agents different from i and j are not
aware of the fact that j has performed the mental operation α, as they only
envisage the copy 1 of the original model.
4. Axiomatization
Let us now present sound and complete axiomatizations for the logics LEK,
LEK+ and their dynamic extensions DLEK, DLEK+. For a logic λ, we write
λ ` ϕ to denote the fact that ϕ is a theorem of λ, i.e., that ϕ belongs to the
least set containing all axioms of λ and closed under the rules of λ.
Definition 3. We define LEK+ to be the extension of classical propositional
logic given by the following rules and axioms:










The logic LEK is the logic obtained by removing (TKi).
It is straightforward to check that all axioms are valid and all rules
preserve validity, from which we obtain:
Lemma 1. The logic LEK(+) is sound for the class of LEK(+) models.
Observe that (DKi) follows from (TKi), but the former is needed in
LEK. Most of the axioms are familiar from modal and epistemic logic,
with the possible exceptions of (Mix1Ki,Bi) and (Mix2Ki,Bi). The lat-
ter simply corresponds to (C2), which states that the neighborhood rela-
tion does not vary within Ri(w). Regarding (Mix1Ki,Bi), observe that if
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ϕ ↔ ψ were valid, then so would Biϕ → Biψ, as then ||ϕ||Mi,w = ||ψ||Mi,w
regardless of M or w. However, as ||ϕ||Mi,w, ||ψ||Mi,w ⊆ Ri(w), it suffices that
||ϕ||Mi,w∩Ri(w) = ||ψ||Mi,w∩Ri(w), i.e., that Ki(ϕ↔ ψ) is true. Note moreover
that Ki(ϕ→ ψ) is not sufficient for Biϕ→ Biψ to hold, as the neighborhood
relation is not assumed monotone.
The axiomatics of the logic DLEK(+) includes all principles of the logic
LEK(+) plus a set of reduction axioms and the rule of replacement of equiv-
alents.
Definition 4. We define DLEK(+) to be the extension of LEK(+) generated
by the following axioms and rule of inference, where G ⊆ H ⊆ Agt, i ∈ G,
k ∈ H \G and j 6∈ H:
[(G:α)H ]p↔p(Red1)
[(G:α)H ]¬ϕ↔¬[(G:α)H ]ϕ(Red2)
[(G:α)H ](ϕ ∧ ψ)↔([(G:α)H ]ϕ ∧ [(G:α)H ]ψ)(Red3)
[(G:α)H ]Kiϕ↔Ki[(G:α)H ]ϕ(Red4)
[(G: + ϕ)H ]Biψ ↔(Bi[(G: + ϕ)H ]ψ ∨ Ki([(G: + ϕ)H ]ψ ↔ ϕ))(Red5)
[(G:− ϕ)H ]Biψ ↔(Bi[(G:− ϕ)H ]ψ ∧ ¬Ki([(G:− ϕ)H ]ψ ↔ ϕ))(Red6)
[(G: `(ϕ,ψ))H ]Biχ↔
(
Bi[(G: `(ϕ,ψ))H ]χ ∨
(
(Biϕ ∧ Ki(ϕ→ ψ))∧(Red7)
Ki[(G: `(ϕ,ψ))H ]χ↔ ψ)
))
[(G: ∩ (ϕ,ψ))H ]Biχ↔
(
Bi[(G: ∩ (ϕ,ψ))H ]χ ∨
(
(Biϕ ∧ Biψ)∧(Red8)










The first four axioms are standard from dynamic epistemic logic. Mean-
while, for i ∈ G the intuition behind all of the (Red5))-((Red8) axioms
is similar; consider, for example, (Red5). The left-hand side states that,
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after adding ϕ as a neighborhood, the agent will believe ψ, i.e. the exten-
sion of ψ within Ri(w) will be a neighborhood in the new model. This
can happen for precisely two reasons: either the extension of ψ in the
new model, i.e. [(G: + ϕ)H ]ψ, already was a neighborhood, in which case
Bi[(G: + ϕ)H ]ψ holds; or, this extension is precisely the neighborhood that
was added, i.e. Ki([(G: + ϕ)H ]ψ ↔ ϕ) holds.
For (Red9) and (Red10) the intuition is that agents in H \G have not
performed the mental operation α but are aware of the fact that mental
operation α has been performed by the agents in G.
For (Red11) and (Red12) the intuition is that, for agents not in H, the
set of possible worlds is exactly the same as it was before those in G realized
the private mental operation. With this in mind, it is straightforward to
check that all axioms are valid and all rules preserve validity in the class of
LEK(+)-models, from which the following is an immediate consequence:
Lemma 2. The logic DLEK is sound for the class of LEK-models, and the
logic DLEK+ is sound for the class of single-agent LEK+ models.
Our goal now is to prove that LEK and LEK+ are strongly complete for
their intended semantics. We will achieve this by a fairly standard canonical-
model argument, although the neighborhood structure will require some
care.
Definition 5 (canonical λ-model). For λ ∈ {LEK, LEK+}, we define the




• W λ is the set of all maximal λ-consistent subsets of LLEK.
• wRλi v if and only if, for all formulas ϕ, Kiϕ ∈ w implies that ϕ ∈ v.
• In order to define Nλ, for w ∈W and ϕ ∈ LLEK, first define Aϕ(i, w) =
{v ∈ Rλi (w) : ϕ ∈ v}. Then, define Nλ by letting Nλ(i, w) = {Aϕ(i, w) :
Biϕ ∈ w}.
• Finally, we define the valuation V λ by w ∈ V λ(p) if and only if p ∈ w.
The following is standard and we omit the proof:
Lemma 3. The structure Mλ defined above is a λ-model. Moreover, if w ∈
W λ and ϕ ∈ LLEK, then
1. Kiϕ ∈ w if and only if, for every v such that wRλi v, ϕ ∈ v, and
2. if wRλi v and Biϕ ∈ w, then Biϕ ∈ v.
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We also need to prove that Mλ has a somewhat less familiar property.
This will be used later in the truth lemma, for the case of Bi.
Lemma 4. For every w ∈W λ and Biϕ,Biψ ∈ LLEK, if Biϕ ∈ w but Biψ 6∈ w,
it follows that there is v ∈ Rλi (w) such that either ϕ ∈ v but ¬ψ ∈ v, or
¬ϕ ∈ v but ψ ∈ v.
Proof. Let w ∈ W λ and ϕ,ψ be such that Biϕ ∈ w, Biψ 6∈ w. Towards a
contradiction, assume that for every v ∈ Rλi (w), either ϕ,ψ ∈ v or ¬ϕ,¬ψ ∈
v; then, it follows from Lemma 3 that Ki(ϕ ↔ ψ) ∈ w, so that by Axiom
(Mix1Ki,Bi), Biψ ∈ w, contrary to our assumption.
With this, we may state and prove our version of the Truth Lemma:
Lemma 5. For every ϕ ∈ LLEK and every w ∈ W λ, ϕ ∈ w if and only if
Mλ, w |= ϕ.
Proof. The proof proceeds by a standard induction on the construction of
ϕ. All cases are routine except ϕ = Biψ.
First assume that Biψ ∈ w. Then, Aψ(i, w) ∈ Nλ(i, w). But, Aψ(i, w) =
{v ∈ Rλi (w) : ψ ∈ v}
IH
= ‖ψ‖ ∩Rλi (w). Thus, Mλ, w |= Biψ.
Now, suppose Biψ 6∈ w, so that ¬Biψ ∈ w. We must check that ‖ψ‖ ∩
Rλi (w) 6∈ N(i, w). Choose an arbitrary set A ∈ N(i, w); by definition, A =
Aθ(i, w) for some θ with Biθ ∈ w. By Lemma 4, there is some v ∈ Rλi (w) such
that ψ,¬θ ∈ v or ¬ψ, θ ∈ v; in the first case, this shows using the induction
hypothesis that v ∈ (‖ψ‖ ∩Rλi (w)) \Aθ(i, w), while in the second we obtain
v ∈ Aθ(i, w)\(‖ψ‖∩Rλi (w)). In either case we obtain Aθ(i, w) 6= ‖ψ‖∩Rλi (w),
and since A = Aθ(i, w) was an arbitrary element of N
λ(i, w), we conclude
that ‖ψ‖ ∩Rλi (w) 6∈ Nλ(i, w) and thus Mλ, w 6|= Biψ.
We are now ready to prove that the static logics are strongly complete.
Theorem 1. For λ ∈ {LEK, LEK+}, λ is strongly complete for the class of
λ-models.
Proof. Any consistent set of formulas Φ may be extended to a maximal
consistent set of formulas w∗ ∈W λ, and Mλ, w∗ |= Φ by Lemma 5.
The strong completeness of the dynamic logics follows from this result,
in view of the fact that the reduction axioms may be used to find, for any
formula, a provably equivalent formula in the static fragment.
Lemma 6. If ϕ is any formula of LDLEK, there is a formula ϕ̃ in LLEK such
that DLEK ` ϕ↔ ϕ̃.
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Proof. This follows by a routine induction on ϕ using the reduction axioms
and the rule of replacement of equivalents (RRE) from Definition 4.
As a corollary, we get the following:
Theorem 2. DLEK is strongly complete for the class of LEK models and
mono-agent DLEK(+) is strongly complete for the class of LEK(+) models.
Proof. If Γ is a DLEK(+)-consistent set of LDLEK formulas, then Γ̃ = {ϕ̃ :
ϕ ∈ Γ} is a LEK(+)-consistent set of LLEK formulas (since DLEK(+) is an
extension of LEK(+)), and hence by Theorem 1, there is a LEK(+)-model M
with a world w such that M,w |= Γ̃. But, since DLEK(+) is sound and for
each ϕ ∈ Γ, DLEK(+) ` ϕ↔ ϕ̃, it follows that M,w |= Γ.
Thus our logics are strongly complete, but the construction we have given
will in general produce infinite models. In the next section, we will consider
the complexity of the satisfiability problem.
5. Complexity
We study the computability of the satisfiability problem of LEK+: given a
formula, determine whether it is satisfiable. Simple changes in the arguments
presented below would allow the reader to adapt our line of reasoning to
LEK. We will also provide a decidability result of the satisfiability problem
of DLEK. We first consider the single-agent case and move then to the
multi-agent case. Below, card(A) denotes the cardinality of the set A.
5.1. Mono-agent case
Assume card(Agt) = 1. Let ϕ be a satisfiable formula. Let M = (W,N, V )
be a model and w ∈ W be such that M,w |= ϕ; note that in the mono-
agent case we can assume that R is the total relation, so we omit it. Let
Kψ1, . . . ,Kψm and Bχ1, . . . ,Bχn be lists of all subformulas of ϕ of the form
Kψ and Bχ. Let K̂ = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ m & M,w 6|= Kψi}, B̂
+
= {j : 1 ≤ j ≤
n & M,w |= Bχj} and B̂
−
= {k : 1 ≤ k ≤ n & M,w 6|= Bχk}. For all i ∈ K̂,
let vi ∈W be such that M,vi 6|= ψi. Such vi exists because M,w 6|= Kψi. For
all j ∈ B̂+, let Aj ∈ N be such that Aj = {v ∈ W : M,v |= χj}. Such Aj
exists because M,w |= Bχj . For all j ∈ B̂
+
and for all k ∈ B̂−, let uj,k ∈W
be such that M,uj,k 6|= χj ↔ χk. Such uj,k exists because M,w |= Bχj and
M,w 6|= Bχk. Let M ′ = (W ′, N ′, V ′) be the model defined by:
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• W ′ = {w} ∪ {vi : i ∈ K̂} ∪ {uj,k : j ∈ B̂
+
& k ∈ B̂−},
• N ′ = {Aj ∩W ′ : j ∈ B̂
+},
• for all p ∈ Atm, V ′(p) = V (p) ∩W ′.
Obviously, card(W ′) and card(N ′) are polynomial in the size of ϕ. Let Φ =
SF (ϕ), the closure under single negations of the set of all of ϕ’s subformulas.
Lemma 7. Let ψ be a formula. If ψ ∈ Φ then for all s ∈ W ′, M, s |= ψ iff
M ′, s |= ψ.
Proof. By induction on ψ. We only consider the cases ψ = Bχ.
Suppose M, s |= Bχ and M ′, s 6|= Bχ. Let j ∈ B̂+ be such that Bχ = Bχj .
Hence, Aj = {t ∈W : M, t |= χ}. By induction hypothesis, Aj ∩W ′ = {t ∈
W ′ : M ′, t |= χ}. Thus, M ′, s |= Bχ: a contradiction.
Suppose M ′, s |= Bχ and M, s 6|= Bχ. Let j ∈ B̂+ be such that Aj ∩
W ′ = {t ∈ W ′ : M ′, t |= χ}. By induction hypothesis, Aj ∩W ′ = {t ∈
W ′ : M, t |= χ}. Let k ∈ B̂− be such that Bχ = Bχk. Remember that
Aj = {t ∈ W : M, t |= χj}. Moreover, uj,k ∈ W ′ is such that M,uj,k |= χj
and M,uj,k 6|= χk, or M,uj,k 6|= χj and M,uj,k |= χk. In the former case,
uj,k ∈ Aj ∩W ′. Hence, M,uj,k |= χ: a contradiction. In the latter case,
uj,k ∈ Aj ∩W ′. Thus, M,uj,k |= χj : a contradiction.
Theorem 3. If card(Agt) = 1 then satisfiability problem of LEK+ is NP-
complete.
Proof. Membership in NP follows from Lemma 7. NP-hardness follows
from the NP-hardness of classical propositional logic.
5.2. Multi-agent case
Our study of the computability in the multi-agent case will be based on the
modal tableaux approach developed by Halpern and Moses [23]. Assume
card(Agt) ≥ 2.
A set T of formulas is said to be fully expanded if for all formulas ϕ in T
and for all formulas ψ in SF (ϕ), either ψ ∈ T , or ¬ψ ∈ T . A propositional
tableau is a set T of formulas such that: (i) for all formulas ϕ, if ¬¬ϕ ∈ T
then ϕ ∈ T ; (ii) for all formulas ϕ,ψ, if ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ T then ¬ϕ ∈ T and
¬ψ ∈ T ; (iii) for all formulas ϕ,ψ, if ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ T then either ϕ ∈ T , or
ψ ∈ T . A propositional tableau T is said to be blatantly consistent iff for
all formulas ϕ, either ϕ 6∈ T , or ¬ϕ 6∈ T .
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A modal tableau is a structure of the form T = (W,R,L) where W is
a nonempty set of states (with typical members denoted w, v, etc), R is a
function associating a binary relation Ri on W to each i ∈ Agt and L is a
function assigning to each w ∈W a blatantly consistent and fully expanded
propositional tableau L(w) such that for all w ∈ W : (i) for all formulas ϕ,
if ¬Kiϕ ∈ L(w) then there exists v ∈ Ri(w) such that ¬ϕ ∈ L(v); (ii) for
all formulas ϕ, if Biϕ ∈ L(w) then for all formulas ψ, if ¬Biψ ∈ L(w)
then there exists v ∈ Ri(w) such that either ϕ ∈ L(v) and ¬ψ ∈ L(v), or
¬ϕ ∈ L(v) and ψ ∈ L(v); (iii) for all formulas ϕ, if Kiϕ ∈ L(w) then for all
v ∈ (Ri ∪ R−1i )?(w), ϕ ∈ L(v) and Kiϕ ∈ L(v); (iv) for all formulas ϕ, if
Biϕ ∈ L(w) then for all v ∈ (Ri∪R−1i )?(w), Biϕ ∈ L(v). For all formulas ϕ,
let L−1(ϕ) = {w : w ∈W & ϕ ∈ L(w)}. We shall say that a modal tableau
T = (W,R,L) is a modal tableau for a formula ϕ if L−1(ϕ) 6= ∅.
Given a model M = (W,R,N, V ), let T ′ = (W ′, R′, L′) be defined by:
W ′ = W , R′i = Ri for each i ∈ Agt, L′ is the function assigning to each
w ∈W ′ the propositional tableau L′(w) = {ϕ : M,w |= ϕ}. The proof that
T ′ is a modal tableau is easy.
Proposition 3. Let ϕ be a formula. If ϕ is satisfiable then there exists a
modal tableau for ϕ.
Given a modal tableau T = (W,R,L), let M ′ = (W ′, R′, N ′, V ′) be
defined by: W ′ = W , R′i = (Ri ∪ R
−1
i )
? for each i ∈ Agt, N ′i(w) = {(Ri ∪
R−1i )
?(w) ∩ L−1(ϕ) : Biϕ ∈ L(w)} for each w ∈ W and for each i ∈ Agt,
V ′ is the function assigning to each p ∈ Atm the subset V ′(p) = {w : w ∈
W & p ∈ L(w)} of W ′. The proof that T ′ is a model is easy. Moreover, one
can prove by induction on ϕ that for all w ∈W , ϕ ∈ L(s) iff M ′, s |= ϕ.
Proposition 4. Let ϕ be a formula. If there exists a modal tableau for ϕ
then ϕ is satisfiable.
By Propositions 3 and 4, satisfiability is reducible to the following deci-
sion problem (MT): given a formula, determine whether there exists a modal
tableau for it. Based on the tools and techniques developed in [23] for ordi-
nary epistemic logics, one can design an algorithm that tries to construct a
modal tableau for a given formula. The main properties of such algorithm
are:
• For all given formulas, the above algorithm terminates and runs in poly-
nomial space,
• for all given formulas ϕ, the algorithm returns “there is a modal tableau
for ϕ” iff there is a modal tableau for ϕ.
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Theorem 4. If card(Agt) ≥ 2 then satisfiability problem of LEK is PSPACE-
complete.
Proof. Membership in PSPACE follows from the above discussion. Mean-
while, PSPACE-hardness follows from the PSPACE-hardness of multi-agent
epistemic logic.
The reduction axioms and the rule of replacement of equivalents in Def-
inition 4 may be used to give a decision procedure for the satisfiability of
DLEK; however, due to exponential blow-up in the size of formulas, this al-
gorithm would no longer remain in PSPACE without modification. Thus we
will state only the following:
Corollary 1. The satisfiability problems of mono-agent DLEK(+) and mul-
ti-agent DLEK are decidable.
Proof. Immediate from the decidability of LEK(+) and the fact that, given
a formula ϕ of LDLEK, the formula ϕ̃ is clearly computable from ϕ.
However, we do not believe that such a procedure would be optimal, and
indeed conjecture that DLEK is in PSPACE. We leave the computation of
its precise complexity for future work.
6. Translation of LLEK into an ordinary modal language: the
mono-agent case
We will show how one can reduce the semantics of LEK+ to a purely relational
semantics, albeit with additional modalities. For simplicity, we will consider
only the mono-agent case, and we will write K,B instead of K1,B1. Simple
changes in the arguments presented below would allow the reader to adapt
our line of reasoning to LEK. Recall that in the mono-agent case, we may
assume that in any LEK+-model (W,N,R, V ) we have that R is the total
relation, so we may omit it. Moreover, since N(w) does not depend on
w ∈ W (given that it is assumed R-invariant), we may identify N with the
set of neighbourhoods N(w0), where w0 ∈W is arbitrary.
The intuition behind our reduction is as follows. Suppose that a mono-
agent model M = (W,N, V ) is given. Then, one can think of M as being
a substructure of a bigger model M ′, whose domain is W ∪ N ; that is, we
may view the neigbhorhoods themselves as new ‘worlds’. In order for M ′ to
contain enough information to interpret the language of LEK+, we need to
include the following relations:
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• To interpret Kϕ at w ∈W , we include an equivalence relation RK linking
w to all ‘real’ worlds. It does not matter how RK behaves on neighbour-
hoods, so on N we may just let RK be the identity.
• To interpret Bϕ at w ∈W , we include:
– a relation RL linking each w ∈ W to each U ∈ N(w). Note in this
case that every point is related to every neighborhood, so we may
simply define RL = W ×N , and
– a relation R linking each U ∈ N to its elements (i.e., URw if and
only if w ∈ U).
This setup would suffice to interpret monotone neighborhood semantics [17].
However, for our strict interpretation, we need some additional structure.
Namely, to check if U is a witness for Bϕ, we must check that every element
of U satisfies ϕ, but also that every element not in U satisfies ¬ϕ. We achieve
this by an additional accessibility relation R, where URw holds whenever
w 6∈ U ; a similar trick has been used in [18, 20] to deal with the ‘inaccessible
worlds’ logic of Humberstone [26].
Let us now formalize these ideas. We begin by defining a new modal
language, LO, given by:
ϕ,ψ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kϕ | Lϕ | ϕ | ϕ
We will use the following abbreviations: K̂ϕ for ¬K¬ϕ, L̂ϕ for ¬L¬ϕ,
♦ϕ for ¬¬ϕ and ϕ for ¬¬ϕ. Let τ : LLEK −→ LO be the translation
function defined by
• τ(p) = p,
• τ(¬ϕ) = ¬τ(ϕ),
• τ(ϕ ∧ ψ) = τ(ϕ) ∧ τ(ψ),
• τ(Kϕ) = Kτ(ϕ),
• τ(Bϕ) = L̂(τ(ϕ) ∧¬τ(ϕ)).
An LO-model is a structure of the form (W,RK , RL, R, R, V ) where
W is a nonempty set of possible worlds, RK , RL, R and R are binary
relations on W and V : W −→ 2Atm is a valuation function. The truth-
conditions are inductively defined as in ordinary modal logic. We will say
that the model (W,RK , RL, R, R, V ) is prestandard iff
• RK is reflexive, transitive and
Euclidean,
• RK ◦RL ⊆ RL,
• RL ⊆ R−1 ∪R
−1
 ,
• RL ◦R ⊆ RK ,
• RL ◦R ⊆ RK .
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If, furthermore, R ∩ R = ∅ then we will say that the prestandard
model (W,RK , RL, R, R, V ) is standard. We will say that ϕ ∈ LO is
prestandard-valid (respectively, standard-valid), in symbols |=pr ϕ (respec-
tively, |=st ϕ), iff ϕ is true at every possible world of every prestandard
(respectively, standard) LO-model.
Lemma 8. Let M = (W,RK , RL, R, R, V ) be a standard LO-model. Let
s0 ∈W . Let M ′ = (W ′, N ′, V ′) be the LEK+-model such that
• W ′ = RK(s0),
• N ′ = {R(A) : A ∈W & s0RLA},
• V ′ : p 7→ V ′(p) = V (p) ∩RK(s0).
Let ϕ ∈ LLEK. For all s ∈W ′, M, s |= τ(ϕ) iff M ′, s |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on ϕ.
Lemma 9. Let M = (W,N, V ) be a LEK+-model such that, for any w ∈W ,
N(w) ∩ W = ∅; this condition is easily obtained if we do not allow the








the standard LO-model such that
• W ′ = W ∪N ,
• R′K = (W ×W ) ∪ IdN ,
• R′L = W ×N ,
• R′ = {(A, s) : A ∈ N & s ∈W & s ∈ A},
• R′ = {(A, s) : A ∈ N & s ∈W & s 6∈ A},
• V ′ : p 7→ V ′(p) = V (p).
Let ϕ ∈ LLEK. For all s ∈W , M, s |= ϕ iff M ′, s |= τ(ϕ).
Proof. By induction on ϕ.
Proposition 5. Let ϕ ∈ LLEK. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. |=LEK+ ϕ; 2. |=st τ(ϕ).
Proof. 1.⇒ 2.) By Lemma 8.
2.⇒ 1.) By Lemma 9.
For those interested by axiomatizing the set of all standard-valid LO-
formulas, let O be the least normal modal logic in LO containing the follow-
ing axioms:





• ϕ→ L(♦ϕ ∨ ϕ),
• Kϕ→ Lϕ,
• Kϕ→ Lϕ.
Proposition 6. Let ϕ ∈ LO. If ϕ is O-derivable then |=st ϕ.
Moreover, the above axioms are Sahlqvist formulas and correspond to the
elementary properties characterizing prestandard LO-models. As a result,
by Sahlqvist Theorems in ordinary modal logic,
Proposition 7. Let ϕ ∈ LO. If |=pr ϕ then ϕ is O-derivable.
Lemma 10. Let M = (W,RK , RL, R, R, V ) be a prestandard LO-model.







′) be the standard LO-model such that
• W ′ = W × {0, 1},
• (s, α)R′K(t, β) iff sRKt,
• (s, α)R′L(t, β) iff sRLt,
• (s, α)R′(t, β) iff sRt & (sRt⇒ β = 0),
• (s, α)R′(t, β) iff sRt & (sRt⇒ β = 1),
• V ′ : p 7→ V ′(p) = V (p)× {0, 1}.
Let f : W ′ −→ W be such that f(s, α) = s. f is a surjective bounded
morphism from M ′ to M .
Proof. Left to the reader.
Proposition 8. Let ϕ ∈ LO. The following conditions are equivalent: 1. ϕ
is O-derivable; 2. |=st ϕ; 3. |=pr ϕ.
Proof. (1. ⇒ 2.) By Proposition 6. (2. ⇒ 3.) By Lemma 10 and the
Bounded Morphism Lemma in ordinary modal logic. (3.⇒ 1.) By Proposi-
tion 7.
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7. Conclusion
Let’s take stock. In the paper we have introduced DLEK, a logical theory
of belief dynamics for resource-bounded agents inspired by existing psy-
chological theories of human memory. We have provided decidability and
complexity results for DLEK as well as for its static fragment LEK. In ad-
dition, we have introduced the logics DLEK+, LEK+, which are suitable for
the mono-agent setting.
Directions of future research are manifold. On the conceptual level, we
plan to complete the conceptual framework described in Section 2 by extend-
ing the family of mental operations with operations of storage of information
in long-term memory. We believe that these kinds of operations can be mod-
elled as special kinds of epistemic actions in the DEL sense. Specifically, a
storage operation modifies an agent’s background knowledge by restricting
the epistemic relation Ri to worlds in which the information ϕ to be stored
is true, under the condition that this information is already available in the
agent’s working memory and explicitly believed by the agent.
In the paper, we have adopted a normative view of the notion of back-
ground knowledge, as the latter is assumed to satisfy ‘omniscience’ principles
such as closure under logical consequence. In future work, we plan to pro-
vide a descriptive analysis of background knowledge by enriching our logical
framework with the notion of degree of activation used in the context of
computational models of human cognition such as ACT-R [33]. The idea is
that every piece of information in an agent’s background knowledge is associ-
ated with a certain degree of activation: the higher the degree of activation,
the higher the availability of the information in the agent’s long-term mem-
ory. Furthermore, an agent can retrieve from her long-term memory only
the background knowledge whose degree of activation is equal to or higher
than a certain threshold θ. From this perspective, it is not necessarily the
case that, after having stored a formula ϕ in her background knowledge, an
agent can retrieve all logical consequences of ϕ and her previous background
knowledge. Indeed, some of these logical consequences may be inactive, i.e.,
their degrees of activation may be below the threshold θ.
On the technical level, as emphasized in Section 5, we plan to obtain a
result about complexity of the satisfiability problem of DLEK. In particular,
we plan to prove that this problem is PSPACE-complete by appropriately
adapting to our framework the technique proposed by Lutz [34] for studying
complexity of the satisfiability problem of public announcement logic (PAL).
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[5] S. N. Artëmov. The logic of justification. Rewiev of Symbolic Logic , 1(4):477–513,
2008.
[6] N. Alechina, B. Logan, and M. Whitsey. A complete and decidable logic for resource-
bounded agents. In Proceedings of AAMAS 2014, pages 606–613. IEEE Computer
Society, 2004.
[7] A. D. Baddeley and G. Hitch. Working memory. In G. H. Bower, editor, The psy-
chology of learning and motivation: Advances in research and theory, pages 47–89.
Academic Press, 1974.
[8] A. Baltag and L. S. Moss. Logics for Epistemic Programs. Synthese, 139(2):165–224,
2004.
[9] A. Baltag and S. Smets. A qualitative theory of dynamic interactive belief revision.
In Proceedings of LOFT 7, pages 13–60. Amsterdam University Press, 2008.
[10] N Cowan. An embedded process model of working memory. In A. Miyake and
P. Shah, editors, Models of working memory: Mechanisms of Active Maintenance
and Executive Control, pages 62–101. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
[11] H. N. Duc. Reasoning about rational, but not logically omniscient, agents. Journal
of Logic and Computation, 7(5):633–648, 1997.
[12] J. Elgot-Drapkin, M. Miller, and D. Perlis. Life on a desert island: Ongoing work
in real-time reasoning. In Proceedings of the 1987 workshop on The Frame Problem,
pages 349–357. Morgan Kaufmann, 1987.
[13] J. Elgot-Drapkin, M. Miller, and D. Perlis. Memory, reason and time: the step-logic
approach. In R. Cummins and J. L. Pollock, editors, Philosophy and AI: Essays at
the Interface, MIT Press, 1991.
[14] J. Elgot-Drapkin, S. Kraus, M. Miller, M. Nirkhe, and D. Perlis. Active logics: A
unified formal approach to episodic reasoning. Technical Report CS-TR-4072, 1999.
[15] R. Fagin and J. Y. Halpern. Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning. Artificial
Intelligence, 34:39–76, 1988.
[16] R. Fagin, J. Y. Halpern, Y. Moses, and M. Y. Vardi. Reasoning about knowledge.
MIT Press, 1995.
A Logical Theory of Belief Dynamics for Resource-Bounded Agents 31
[17] O. Gasquet and A. Herzig. Translation-based deduction methods for modal logics.
In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Processing and
Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems (IPMU’94), pages 399–408.
Springer, 1995.
[18] O. Gasquet and A. Herzig. Translating inaccessible worlds logic into bimodal logic.
In Proceedings of the European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches
to Reasoning and Uncertainty (ECSQARU ’93), pages 145–150. Springer, 1993.
[19] A. Goldman. Theory of Mind. In E. Margolis, R. Samuels, and S. Stich, editors,
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press, 2012.
[20] V. Goranko. Completeness and Incompleteness in the Bimodal Base L(R,−R). In
Mathematical Logic, pages 311–326. Springer, 1990.
[21] J. Grant, S. Kraus, and D. Perlis. A logic for characterizing multiple bounded agents.
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 3(4):351–387, 2000.
[22] D. Grossi and F. R. Velázquez-Quesada. Twelve Angry Men: A study on the fine-
grain of announcements. In Proceedings of LORI 2009, volume 5834 of LNCS, pages
147–160. Springer, 2009.
[23] J. Halpern and Y. Moses. A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics
of knowledge and belief. Artificial Intelligence, 54:319–379, 1992.
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